

A study of peer learning in public sector reforms

Experience, experiments and ideas to guide future practice

Part Three:

Annexes

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Prepared for the Effective Institutions Platform
September 2015

Contents

Annex 1: Topics commonly targeted by peer learning efforts	3
Annex 2: The 52 peer engagement and learning facilitators ‘mapped’	5
Annex 3: Brief case studies of peer learning experience	9
Annex 4: Focal areas of relevant literatures on peer engagement and learning.....	36
Annex 5: Do you have a community of practice to build upon?	39
Annex 6: Evaluating peer learner experience.....	41
Annex 7: The PEMPAL peer learning evaluation mechanism.....	42
Annex 8: A glossary of terms and terminology	46
Annex 9: Ideas to employ in different stages of the peer learning process.....	50
A. Strategising through a “theory of change” to help in determining if this is for you	50
B. Fostering peer engagement.....	51
C. Fostering sustained individual contacts	56
D. Fostering actual peer learning.....	60
E. Diffusing lessons from peers to their organisations.....	63
References	69

Annex 1: Topics commonly targeted by peer learning efforts

Overall domain	Area of specialism	Specific areas where objectives might be set
Technical aspects of change	Country systems (See (Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, 2011; CABRI, 2014; Holt & Manning, 2014, p.4; OECD, 2008a))	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Budgetary and financial management system <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning and budgeting • Financial management • Accounting, fiscal reporting and audit ii. Procurement system <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality management in legislations and regulations • Capacity development • Operations and market practices • Transparency iii. Public administration system <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Management of operations within the core administration • Quality management in policy and regulatory management • Coordination of the public sector HRM regime outside the core administration iv. “Public information” and administrative accountability systems <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access for citizens to information including open government and transparency • Public accountability mechanisms and anti-corruption authorities • Monitoring and evaluation framework for sector ministries v. Revenue mobilisation system <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tax policy • Tax administration
	Sequencing	<p>Behind the frequently repeated mantra of “first things first” there are many attempts at defining exactly what is meant by the “basics” in public financial management with many similarities but with less than perfect consensus – see (Tommasi, 2009, p.22) and (Browne, 2010). Most sequencing arguments are based around the premise that some basic disciplines (typically around managing financial and public financial management inputs) should be entrenched prior to elaborate arrangements for measuring and managing outputs/performance. This case was most prominently articulated in (Schick, 1998) and the associated mantra of “look before you leapfrog”. This was followed by the World Bank’s Public Expenditure Management Handbook (World Bank, 1998) which stressed the importance of getting the basics right first:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Control inputs before seeking to control outputs • Account for cash before moving to accrual accounting • Operate a reliable budget for inputs before moving to budgeting for results • Make a comprehensive budget and reliable accounting system before trying an integrated financial management system • Get a proper budgeting and accounting function before

		<p>strengthening the auditing function</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do reliable financial auditing before trying performance auditing. <p>In relation to PFM, the most recent (and most comprehensive) summary of assumptions concerning what comes first is set out in (Diamond, 2012). Similar ideas are found in relation to HRM within the public sector. See for example (Manning & Parison, 2003, particularly figure 3) and the emphasis on different possibilities in HRM reform once a “formality threshold” has been reached and the “tradition of rule following is well-entrenched” – whether that entrenched formality is around the neutral, apoliticism urged by the western public sector tradition or disciplined commitment to the specific policy doctrine of the agency that they work within as (Rothstein, 2014) finds in the administration of China. A “basics first” logic has also been proposed in relation to the introduction of a performance orientation in the public sector (Manning, 2009). Assisting peer learners with practical insights into reform sequencing could be a very positive outcome of the learning process.</p>
	Avoiding collateral damage	Finally, in the list of technical skills that peer learning might assist with, there are the knowledge and insights to help guard against collateral damage arising from perverse incentives in donor projects which provide salary top-ups or other rewards which undermine public officials’ interest in their broader duties (Lindner, 2013; Mukherjee & Manning, 2002).
Learning about flexibility and humility in change management	“New realist” approaches to development in general and governance and public sector management in particular (Matt Andrews, 2013b) essentially argue for a reform approach which is agnostic about preferred processes or organisational forms and locally-led and adapted as lessons emerge during implementation. In OECD countries, (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011) have made similar arguments for moderation and adaptive approaches. (Melchor, 2008; OECD, 2005) both observe and welcome the prevalence of incremental adaptation in reform.	
Learning about “politically savvy” perspectives on change	Public sector management is not separate from politics – political influences and interest group preferences pervade every country system, every relationship and every transaction. The challenge is to identify where the political returns are in the existing arrangements, to understand how political forces are aligned in relation to the problem at hand and to assess what can be changed and what must be navigated within.	
Learning “constructive subversion” and resistance to promotion of commodified reform packages	The problem is that, contrary to the common observation that reforms to core public administration are very difficult to implement, in reality they are surprisingly easy to make both in OECD settings (Gingrich, 2015; Pollitt, 2007) and in middle and lower income settings (Matt Andrews, 2013c; World Bank, 2012b). The challenge lies in making them worthwhile in practice. Much reform energy has been stimulated by commodified reform products; managerial prescriptions which overclaim about their likely reach along the results chain described above and which can be applied regardless of the uncertainty about their fit within a complex context. The over-selling of reforms has been clearly identified in recent research (Matthew Andrews, 2008; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011) and the incentives to continue this are evident, inter alia, in the size of the OECD public sector management reform business.	

Annex 2: The 52 peer engagement and learning facilitators 'mapped'

Initiative	Website
Africa Electricity Regulator Peer Review and Learning Network	http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/s.asp?p=155
Africa-Asia Drought Risk Management Peer Assistance Network (AADP)	http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Environment%20and%20Energy/sustainable%20land%20management/AADP%20Brochure.pdf
African Community of Practice on Managing for Development Results (AfCoP),	http://www.impactalliance.org/ev_en.php?ID=49248_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC
African Development Bank WOP Africa Project	http://www.afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/project-portfolio/project/p-z1-ea0-005/
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)	http://www.pacweb.org/Documents/APRM/APRM_Seven_countries_March2010-E.pdf ; http://aprm-au.org
African Risk Capacity	http://www.africanriskcapacity.org/events/past
African Transitional Justice Research Network	http://www.transitionaljustice.com
Centre for Excellence in Finance	http://www.cef-see.org
Centre for Financial Reporting Reform (CFRR), Strengthening Auditing and Reporting in the Countries of the Eastern Partnership (STAREP)	http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/EXTCENFINREPREF/0..contentMDK:23584520~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:4152118,00.html
Centres for Learning on Evaluation And Results (CLEAR)	http://www.theclearinitiative.org/PDFs/ar-2013-2014.pdf
Circle of Sustainability	http://www.circlesofsustainability.org/tools/peer-review-process/
Cities Development Initiative	http://cdia.asia/2014/11/21/asian-cities-to-strengthen-peer-to-peer-learning-on-urban-infrastructure-innovations/
CityNet association of urban stakeholders committed to sustainable development	http://citynet-ap.org
Club de Madrid LEND Network	http://www.clubmadrid.org/en/programa/lend_network_for_leaders_engaged_in_new_democracies
Collaborative African Budget Reform Initiative	http://www.cabri-sbo.org
Conference on PIC Systems in EU Member States	http://ec.europa.eu/budget/events/pic2012_en.cfm

Corruption Hunter Network	http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704067504575305200456314876
Demand for Good Governance Peer Learning Network	http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/0,,contentMDK:21589459~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:244363,00.html
Development Alternatives and Resource Centre	http://ptfund.org/2012/12/transparency-public-procurement-nigeria/
Ethiopian Cities Association	http://www.citiesalliance.org/node/3668
GoPemPal	http://www.gopempal.org/?q=about-us
Horizontal Learning Program in Bangladesh	http://www.wsp.org/sites/wsp.org/files/publications/horizontal_learning_strengthening_capacities.pdf
IMF African Technical Assistance Centres (AfriTAC)	http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2014/car121614a.htm ; http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2015/car020215a.htm
International Association of Anticorruption Authorities (IAACA)	http://www.iaaca.org
International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI)	http://www.intosai.org/news.html
IPAC International programming	http://www.ipac.ca/international_programming
Kyrgyz Transparency and Accountability in Budgeting Peer Assisted Learning Network	http://www.efca.kg/project-view/transparency-and-accountability-in-local-budgeting-peer-assisted-learning/
Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool Peer Learning	http://www.wildernessfoundation.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=142:mett-peer-learning-sessions-help-identify-effective-solutions&catid=2:news&Itemid=18
Medicines Transparency Alliance	http://www.medicinestransparency.org/meta-countries/uganda/
MENA-OECD Procurement network	http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/Governance%20structure%20of%20the%20Network.pdf
Mistra Urban Futures	http://www.mistraurbanfutures.org/en/node/1065
OECD Anticorruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia	http://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/aboutthenetwork/
OECD Joint Learning Studies	http://www.oecd.org/corruption/ethics/oecdjointlearningstudies.htm
OECD Knowledge Sharing Alliances	http://www.oecd.org/knowledge-sharing-alliance/
OECD Peer Reviews	http://www.oecd.org/site/peerreview/

Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat	http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/about-us/
Public Expenditure Management Network in Asia (PEMNA)	http://blog-pfm.imf.org/pfmblog/2014/12/sharing-success-in-asia-through-pemna.html
Public Expenditure Management Peer Assisted Learning Network (PEMPAL)	http://www.pempal.org
Regional Anticorruption Programme for Africa	http://www.aucorruption.org/uploads/Regional Anti-Corruption Programme.pdf
Results for Development Transparency and Accountability Program (R4DTAP)	http://r4d.org/about-us/press-room/r4d's-transparency-and-accountability-program-convenes-african-civil-society-org
SADC SOE Network	http://www.oecd.org/southafrica/soe-africa.htm
South African Community Grantmaker Leadership Cooperative	http://www.sacglf.org/document.centre.reports.of.peer.learning.events
Tax Administrators eXchange for Global Innovative Practices (TAXGIP)	http://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/tax-lessons-peers
TCI: The global practitioners network for competitiveness, clusters and innovation	http://www.tci-network.org/reviews
The International Financial Corporation's (IFC) 2009 peer event on <i>Doing Business</i> reforms.	https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/10497/547650BRI0IFC011peer0learning0event.pdf?sequence=1 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/EXTCENFINREPREF/0..contentMDK:23468684~menuPK:9341783~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:4152118,00.html
The Peer Learning Programme for Small and Diaspora Organisations	http://cgi-africa.org/who-we-are-plp/
The Southeast Europe Tax Transparency and Simplification Program	http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/region_ext_content/regions/europe+middle+east+and+north+africa/ifc+in+europe+and+central+asia/countries/the+southeast+europe+tax+transparency+and+simplification+program
Transparency International School on Integrity	http://www.transparency.org/news/event/transparency_international_school_on_integrity_lithuania
Urban Nexus Project	http://www2.gtz.de/urbanet/opencommunity/news/detail.asp?number=4220
WHO Peer learning district initiative	http://www.afro.who.int/pt/tanzania/press-materials/item/6590-who-improves-district-health-service-delivery-through-the-peer-learning-district-

	initiative/6590-who-improves-district-health-service-delivery-through-the-peer-learning-district-initiative.html
World Bank Knowledge Hubs	www.knowledgehubs.org
World Vision Project Model Accelerated Learning and Support (PALS)	https://www.worldvision.com.au/Libraries/SEED_page/PALS.pdf

Annex 3: Brief case studies of peer learning experience

Nigeria

Joe Abah is Director General of the Bureau of Public Sector Reforms (BPSR) in Nigeria

Key message:

Peer learning can contribute significantly to reform efforts but has a poor track record in Nigeria where it has been associated with discredited study tours and where donors have not always adapted their advice and resources to suit the country's peculiarities. In the complex and politically challenging task of reducing expenditures on ghost employees and creating a strong workforce planning function within ministries and departments, useful lessons from peers were available in-country from those states and federal agencies which had already made significant progress. Experiences from other countries would have offered little more.

The Nigerian public service did not know how many staff it employed. The government was spending well over 75% of its resources to pay less than 1% of its citizens (public servants). There was a suspicion that a large number of the people collecting salaries were "ghost" workers and pensioners, and this suspicion was borne out with the introduction of the Integrated Payroll and Personnel Information System (IPPIS). The system included a biometric component which ensures that all wage and salary payments are associated with a unique individual. To date, this has weeded out 60,000 ghost workers and saved the government \$3 million in its first month of operation in 2007 and a total of more than \$1 billion to date, even though only about 60% of government establishments have been covered by the system.

In the first instance, the reform has focused primarily on improving the functioning of central agencies like the Office of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation, the

Office of the Accountant General of the Federation and the Budget Office of the Federation. However, as it is an integrated government-wide payroll system it will eventually have an impact on all entities that draw funds from the Federal Budget, including the Police and the Universities.

The introduction of the IPPIS has been combined with a systematic strengthening of the HR capacity at the ministry/department level and very particularly the development of a robust role for the Strategic Human Resource Managers. Thus the objective is not just cost-cutting (although that is clearly important) but also to empower departmental HR professionals to match organisational delivery priorities with workforce planning, including skill identification and recruitment. The reform began with payroll management and is only now focusing on the Human Resource Management aspects, a full 8 years after the IPPIS system was put in place.

In this way, the intended impact of the reforms includes fiscal savings but is also improved functioning of all the covered entities – whether their function is policy development, management oversight or service delivery.

While there was a clear reform plan for piloting IPPIS in a few ministries, the wider rollout and the deepening of the reforms to include strategic human resource management was virtually unplanned. The Bureau of Public Service Reforms initiated the reform with a team which includes the Office of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation, the Federal Civil Service Commission, the Office of the Accountant General of the Federation, the Budget Office of the Federation and Galaxy Backbone (the government IT provider). Because the initial emphasis was on payroll, the reform team was largely driven and sustained by the Office of the Accountant General of the Federation. The Office of the Head of Service has now regained the driving seat in order to put in place the HR component.

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I am generally supportive of the idea of peer learning, and found my experiences as a member of a Commonwealth Peer Review Group to be very productive. I learnt that although the challenges facing countries differ in scale and complexity, many common issues can be found among different countries. In that experience, my peers learned from me how Nigeria had addressed challenges that they were currently facing. It helped me to learn about prioritising change, identifying the immediate challenge amongst a long list of problems, and helped me reflect on how to strike a balance between whole of government reforms and a narrower focus on specific reform adaptation.

That said, the Nigerian public service is notorious for visiting other countries on various forms of study tour, but this is often just an excuse to claim very generous duty tour allowances. There is very little link between what they learn from peers and what gets done on the ground here. It is for this reason that the Federal Government has recently announced a ban on foreign training and a general restriction on foreign travel.

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The fiscal necessity of the IPPIS scheme was clear to all and since many state governments within Nigeria had embarked on similar initiatives before the federal IPPIS, and even some federal government organisations such as the Federal Inland Revenue Service had done something similar using the SAP software, rich lessons from practical experiences were available within the country. No peer learning has been undertaken or is planned with other countries.

Donors were influential in getting the IPPIS programme off the ground, primarily through a credit from the World Bank’s Economic Reform and Governance Programme. The World Bank also provided a project manager for the initial phase of the programme, who was a Nigerian citizen with similar experience from elsewhere. However, beyond introducing the scheme, donors have had little influence on these reforms – partly because

their budgetary contribution is so small (the sum total of donor assistance to Nigeria is less than 1% of Gross National Income) and partly because of their overriding focus on ‘numbers’ and quantitative ‘results.’ Once the ‘ghost worker’ figures had been announced, there didn’t seem to be a planned programme of support for the country to deepen the gains of IPPIS.

There have been two problems in the reform design – neither of which would have been ameliorated by external peer learning. First, there has been some over-emphasis on monies saved at the expense of the strategic human resource management aspects of the reform. Second, limited arrangements for “Change Management” have meant that resistance from those with valid concerns, as well as those who are benefiting from the existence of ghost workers, has not been well managed.

If peer learning had any place at all, it would be in relation to the state governments and other federal government organisations such as the Federal Inland Revenue Service. That happened to the extent that bidders for IPPIS were required to demonstrate that their solutions had worked elsewhere in Nigeria. Government officials went round to look at those project sites and to talk to users, providing some grounding to claims made.

Hungary

Ms. Edit Németh is Head of Department, Central Harmonisation Unit for Public Internal Control, Ministry for National Economy, Hungary.

Key message:

Ms. Németh’s priority in assuming leadership of the Central Harmonisation Unit in 2010 was to ensure that new internal control processes reflected the intention of the new Public Finance Act in central and local governments, aligning behaviours with the spirit and the letter of new laws. Post-accession reforms such as these received less support than the earlier round of structural reforms. The PEMPAL Internal Audit Community of Practice

(IACOP) was particularly valuable for Ms. Németh in offering the opportunity for more detailed and personal sharing of experience, particularly in helping her understand the scope of the task when new in the job. In addition to the technical support, IACOP was helpful to Ms. Németh in reviewing options for forming and operating the change team. Ms. Németh finds it significant that IACOP is self-governing as this encourages ownership by the members.

Ms. Németh assumed her responsibilities in 2010, when the main formal structural reforms associated with EU accession had been completed. The Central Harmonisation Unit (CHU) had 15 staff and support from a public sector training organisation. Her priority was to ensure that the practice of the new internal control processes reflected the intention of the new Public Finance Act in central and local governments, aligning behaviours with the spirit as well as the letter of the new laws. She had a clear reform plan from the outset, stretching over several years. Her initial task was to review all relevant legislation and guidelines – material which she was familiar with because of her previous role as internal auditor. This led her to undertake a significant simplification of the legislation and some modification to their content to ensure alignment with international audit standards and to plug gaps which had become evident. She also introduced a training and certification system on control procedures for staff: internal auditors, heads and financial managers of public budgetary organisations in all levels of government. There is now a quality assurance process in place, entailing visits to public bodies to evaluate their internal control system and to address questions and concerns.

In retrospect, and if Ms. Németh had been in the post at that time, she would have developed the training system earlier, in parallel with rather than following changes in the legislation – and those legislative changes would have focused on internal control at the same time as internal audit.

The accession reforms had been assisted by regular dialogue with the EU (DG Enlargement) and by support from EU Twinning and “Twinning Light” projects. Hungary’s twinning partner was France, and later Germany. In addition, there were regular missions

from OECD/Sigma and support from the major accounting firms including Arthur Andersen, KPMG and Ernst &Young in elaborating the procedure manuals.

The post-accession reforms coordinated by Ms. Németh were supported, to a lesser extent, by the EU “Twinning Light” program, which assisted in the development of the Training and Certification System, and more open-ended support from the Public Internal Control Working Group of the EU (DG Budget) and the PEMPAL Internal Audit Community of Practice (IACOP). The Public Internal Control Working Group is the formal forum for cooperation between EU member states, but it helps also to create informal connections addressing problems as they arise. IACOP was particularly valuable for Ms. Németh in offering the opportunity for more detailed sharing of experience in the light of reforms undertaken in other countries. The group includes representatives from 23 countries and staff from the World Bank and the Netherlands National Academy for Finance and Economics. The CHU is planning an international conference on internal audit and internal control.

“The long term personal relationships established through the Public Internal Control Working Group and the PEMPAL Internal Audit Community of Practice (IACOP) were of great value. When Ms. Németh was new in the job it helped her understand the scope of the task. There are no similar organisations within Hungary and so contacts with others with similar responsibilities in other countries were of great practical value.”

The long term personal relationships established through the Public Internal Control Working Group and the PEMPAL Internal Audit Community of Practice (IACOP) were of great value. When Ms. Németh was new in the job it helped her understand the scope of the task. There are no similar organisations within Hungary and so contacts with others with similar responsibilities in other countries were of great practical value. In addition to the technical support, IACOP was helpful to Ms. Németh in reviewing options for forming and operating the change team. Discussions during meetings take varied forms (table discussions, case studies, fishbowl, role plays, world café etc.) and continue between

formal meetings via -mail, wikispace, skype etc. PEMPAL IACOP is elaborating and publishing knowledge products which are also very useful (e.g. Internal Audit Manual, Risk Assessment in Audit Planning, Quality Assurance etc.). Ms. Németh finds it significant that IACOP is self-governing (although funded by World Bank, Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, OECD and the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs) as this encourages ownership by the members.

Malaysia

Koshy Thomas is Deputy Director and Head of the Outcome Based Budgeting Project Team, National Budget Office, Ministry of Finance in Malaysia.

Key message:

The key challenge in the introduction of Outcome-based Budgeting (OBB) is to move mind-sets from procedural compliance to pro-active responsibility for improving ministry level strategic processes. Peer learning was useful at a general strategic level but had little to offer when reform implementation commenced, not least because the development of an online application for sharing objectives, budget submissions and impact data was specific to Malaysia and had not been achieved elsewhere. In retrospect, peers in other countries might have been able to offer more guidance on the ‘soft aspects’ of managing resistance through a change management and communication strategy.

Koshy and team with technical advice from Dr. Aru Rasappan¹ have designed, developed and are in the process of implementing Outcome-based Budgeting (OBB) as part of an integrated results-based management approach being introduced across the public sector. The work includes awareness programs, training of trainers, and data quality improvement workshops. At the heart of the reform, and to facilitate data management, a

¹ Dr. Aru Rasappan, Senior Advisor to the Centre for Research and Development in Evaluation (CeDRE) International; developed the IRBM Model used as the basis for OBB in Malaysia

software application has been developed which underpins strategy development, budget preparation and performance reporting for all sector ministries.

The reforms started with policy review at the national and sectoral levels, with high level objectives identified which are then cascaded to the Ministries leading to the reformulation of Programs and Sub programs at the ministry level. The initial policy review involved 3 key central agencies: the Economic Planning Unit; MOF; and the Public Services Department. The roll-out cascades the objectives down to the line ministries and statutory bodies, but currently it excludes state governments and financially independent government companies.

Three years into the reforms, the focus is on building capacity and managing change in the ministries. Improving planning mechanisms and improving the quality of the data have been priorities in preparation for performance reporting. This has already helped identify program redundancies with associated cost savings, with significant additional savings anticipated. The most noticeable results were in strategy building and execution as opposed focusing on processes and outputs. Outputs were better designed and executed as it has linkages to achievement of outcomes. With an improved performance framework, it is anticipated that improved accountability through better transparency will be achieved in those ministries (9 ministries) where it has been piloted.

The main challenge for the reforms is to move mind-sets from procedural compliance to pro-active responsibility for improving ministry level strategic processes.

There was a comprehensive 5 year reform plan established at the outset with a number of sub committees established to drive specific aspects of the institutional and legal framework reform. The reform was driven by a dedicated team that reported to the Steering Committee chaired by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Finance and including the DG of the Economic Planning Unit, the Public services Depart and other Central Agencies.

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Malaysia-specific development of an online application for strategic planning, budget submissions and performance reporting.”

The overall reform design led internally, but there was significant peer input via visits to other countries including Canada, NZ, and Singapore. Reviews were also made on systems used in Australia and United Kingdom. A regional COP on Managing for Development Results funded by the ADB was helpful, and specific lessons were learned from Thailand, China, Korea and Singapore. Malaysia continues to collaborate with Thailand and Korea on aspects of program evaluation. Local technical advisors were contracted when there was insufficient capacity in-house. Peers were useful in helping to think through the overall strategy and implementation tactics of the reforms, but had little to offer in the very Malaysia-specific development of an online application for strategic planning, budget submissions and performance reporting. While on-line budget submission has been undertaken in many countries, the difference in Malaysia is that it was accompanied by a comprehensive results framework. It is a government wide modular system that allows ministries and programs to manage performance and expenditure online.

Malaysia has been evolving various approaches to performance management for more than 30 years and most people have reasonable understanding of the basic concepts. The challenge was moving from process driven operations to a strategy driven operations, with a new type of leadership. There has been a fair amount resistance from departments, not so much on the issue of accountability but rather on the increased documentation in the initial years of building the framework.

Many lessons were taken from the private sector, where strategy driven initiatives are more established than in public sector. Koshy and colleagues managed to get transformational leaders to provide talks to the senior management in public service. However, he considers that more could have been done to manage change and achieve buy-in from agencies through more effective communication strategies. In sum, while change management was recognised as major challenge during implementation, in retrospect

more attention could have been paid to peer experiences from others in the public sector which might have been able to offer guidance on managing resistance better.

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Samoa

Oscar Thomas Malielegaoi is Director’s Advisor at the Asian Development Bank with responsibility for Armenia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Indonesia, Kyrgyz Republic, New Zealand, Samoa and Tonga. He was previously head of the Budget Division in Samoa where this case is located.

Key message:

The new “Performance Framework” introduced by the Ministry of Finance in Samoa in 2010/11 is shifting the focus of government budgeting to an outcome based approach to performance. Peer learning was not a fundamental part of the reform although a short study tour of Australia provided some ideas at the general strategic level. There was significant funding and some technical support from AusAID (now DFAT) but the project design and implementation was firmly driven by Samoa’s Ministry of Finance.

In 2010, the Samoa Ministry of Finance introduced a new “Performance Framework”, shifting the focus of government budgeting to an outcome based approach to performance. The focus of this reform was not both to transform the operations and efficiency within Line Ministries and to help them demonstrate the relationship between

their outputs and higher level outcomes sought by government, identified under Samoa's "Strategy for the Development of Samoa". Hence, the reform promoted a sector wide approach with sector level delivery actors and key stakeholders widely consulted during the preparation and implementation phases.

From a Ministry of Finance perspective, the new Framework has had some positive impact on budgeting and financial management systems and has established that future resources and budget envelopes depend on effective execution of current work plans and existing Ministry outputs. Ministries can now clearly demonstrate how their outputs contribute to higher level national outcomes and there is some redirection of resources to priority areas. Both MoF and line ministry staff are now focused on measurable and realistic outcomes and impacts.

Government adopted a cautious approach with implementation following a 2 stage phased approach. 8 pilot ministries were selected in 2010/2011 with the remaining agencies included the following year. Lessons learned from the 8 pilot ministries were addressed in the next financial year budget.

The Ministry of Finance's Budget and Planning Committee consisting of key Divisions within the Ministry (Budget Division, Planning Division, Aid and Debt Management Division, Accounts Division, State Owned Monitoring Division and the Public Financial Management Unit) led the reform. The project team consisted mainly of the Budget team but was closely supported by Management and staff from other key Divisions who were part of the Budget Planning Committee.

The result of the reform is that Ministries asking for more resources must offer real deliverables in terms of demonstrating how resources are to be spent on outputs to achieve higher level outcomes. Government will thus be in a far better position in deciding how to allocate limited funding to priority areas. The streamlining of performance measures into more realistic Key Performance Indicators ensures some standardisation of results frameworks. The Budget Committee (consisting of representatives from MoF, PSC and Audit) sits in early February to review and scrutinise line ministries performance for the first six months of the FY and to engage them in a conversation about financial performance, service delivery and achievement of outcomes and targets.

“Other than a 2 week study tour of Australia with visits and meetings conducted with both State and Commonwealth Officials in the Department of Finance and Deregulation in Melbourne, Canberra and Brisbane, there was no influence from peers in other similar countries in the region in designing or in implementing the reforms.”

Other than a 2 week study tour of Australia with visits and meetings conducted with both State and Commonwealth Officials in the Department of Finance and Deregulation in Melbourne, Canberra and Brisbane, there was no influence from peers in other similar countries in the region in designing or in implementing the reforms. The project was a component of Samoa’s PFM reform program assistance provided by Development partners with significant funding and some technical support from AusAID. AusAID (now DFAT) was very flexible and open to suggestions and advice from our own officials and practitioners but the project was driven by Samoa’s Ministry of Finance with only technical advice provided by donors.

Visible increases to budget resources for Health and Education have been translated into better health and education facilities with improved curriculum materials, teacher development and medical school scholarships.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Jean-Paul Mabaya is the “Conseiller Principal en charge des Réformes” in the “Cabinet du Premier Ministre” in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Key message:

Establishing sector “roadmaps” towards improved service delivery underpinned by sector performance contracts signed between the heads of department and the Prime Minister initially proved difficult because they tend towards formulaic, generic documents with little

practical bite. Regular international peer learning has provided informal and “down to earth” practical suggestions which have helped to improve the realism and the impact of the roadmaps and contracts. The peer contact was not intensive – they met less often than every two months – but it was long term and sustained over several years.

Since 2012, Mr. Mabaya has been assisting the PM of DRC to improve the quality of the policy process within the executive, ensuring that policy priorities are fully discussed and costed, and introducing a system of performance contracts for senior staff to ensure their implementation. The identification of the policy process (priority-setting and effective implementation) as the key problem to be tackled emerged from a joint donor-government evaluation of the PRSP in March 2010. That review found that the government priorities were driven by donor priorities with implementation monitored by diverse donor-led M&E arrangements. The consequence was little connection between sector priorities and medium term planning priorities and budget realities. A new government came into office in DRC in May 2012 with a 5-year program, endorsed by the National Assembly, with an expressed determination to address this, although this in turn reflected commitments made in the peace deal that ended the civil war in the DRC (Sun City 2003).

The initial focus of the reform was on systems and arrangements within the PM’s department, ensuring that policy proposals are consistent with sector priorities and firmly located within planning and budgeting systems. This approach was shared with and accepted by members of the government during their very first government seminar in July 2012. This aspect has undoubtedly led to an improvement in the prioritisation of government policies. The sector departments’ “roadmaps” published in May 2012 and the associated pilot sector performance contracts signed between the heads of department and the Prime Minister in September 2012 were somewhat formulaic and not particularly realistic. One year later, the 2013 “roadmaps” and the performance contracts were more clearly linked to agreed sector priorities and the budgetary implications are fully explored. This has allowed better alignment of quarterly commitment plans with cash flow planning.

Translating these “upstream” improvements into “downstream” sector results is the most challenging aspect of this work. Unsurprisingly, the binding constraint is the way that the civil service operates.

The approach has been to pilot the introduction of performance contracts, in order to provide guidance and incentives for senior line department staff, while simultaneously seeking to improve the incentives and performance of the wider civil service.²

The pilot performance contracts were monitored monthly by PM’s advisers and senior members of the involved departments. These meetings reviewed progress in the way spending ministries implemented and monitored their performance contracts in achieving key sector priorities. There was also an attempt to generate public demand for progress by publication of departmental performance in May 2013.

“...this formal process was supplemented by quarterly international peer support funded by the World Bank. This mechanism has provided useful peer learning and was successful because it provided informal and “down to earth” practical suggestions”

Most crucially, this formal process was supplemented by quarterly international peer support funded by the World Bank.³ This mechanism has provided useful peer learning and was successful because it provided informal and “down to earth” practical suggestions to Mr. Mabaya and to other staff of the PM’s department, on a distinctly personal level.

Mr. Mabaya defines a peer as a professional in the same area of work and with similar responsibilities in another country. He describes “peer learning” as a way of exchanging experiences between colleagues doing a similar job but working or having worked in different contexts, with the aim of unblocking reform obstacles and avoiding

² The government of DRC has adopted and published a strategy for civil service reform which includes the implementation of a new dedicated HR unit within every department. The World Bank is providing technical assistance to help develop a new HR procedure manual, setting new rules for individual objectives assignment and annual performance evaluation. At the same time DfID is building the capacity of the PM’s department to monitor and assess the implementation of performance contracts signed by the PM.

³ From July 2012 to January 2014 Mr. Tertius Zongo (former Prime Minister of Burkina Faso) and Serge Michailof (former World Bank country director) conducted six country missions.

traps. He has participated in various peer learning processes including regional workshops on CSR in Africa (African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development/CAFRAD), but the mentoring arrangements with these very experienced colleagues were the most valuable peer learning process he has engaged in. With their assistance, he learned about maintaining momentum for institutional change through permanent dialogue, sustaining a coalition of reformers and identifying some quick wins. The peer learning particularly focused on the importance of personal contacts and using one to one meetings with those affected by reform in building confidence.

“Mr. Mabaya defines a peer as a professional in the same area of work and with similar responsibilities in another country. He describes “peer learning” as a way of exchanging experiences between colleagues doing a similar job but working or having worked in different contexts, with the aim of unblocking reform obstacles and avoiding traps... The peer contact was not intensive – they met less often than every two months – but it was long term, sustained over several years.”

The peer contact was not intensive – they met less often than every two months – but it was long term, sustained over several years. They visited each other’s workplaces and maintained contact by email. Mr. Mabaya made use of the peers’ experiences and short technical notes from them to shape the dialogue about performance contracts.

There has subsequently been a strong demand from some provincial executives to benefit from similar peer support. A couple of provincial governors are currently working with peers to assist them in developing performance measurement tools. There was an attempt to set up a peer learning arrangement with former ministers of finance to act as mentors to the Ministry of Finance – but this was resisted.

There is no shortage of technical specialists available from the donors. What are needed, in Mr. Mabaya’s view, are more informal and flexible peer-based arrangements able to help seize reform opportunities which are specific to DRC.

Malawi⁴

As a country, Malawi underwent a peer review in 2004—under the auspices of the African Peer Review Mechanism. The integrated financial management information system (IFMIS) was one of the areas targeted for change in this review. This case examined the impact of the review.

Key message:

Peer engagement is common across the developing world, and is intended to promote reforms by fostering pressure to act, learning about how to act, and reflection on the result of action. Peer evaluations are frequently used to promote this kind of engagement, as are study tours to 'better practice' peers. These mechanisms have a lot of potential but can also produce distortionary results when they are used in an overly mechanical, hurried manner.

The review provided a long list of deficiencies in the IFMIS, and emphasised that political and other incentives in the government had undermined past reform progress. Under pressure to respond to this review, and with a new president pushing the reform, government officials visited Tanzania in March 2005 to learn about its IFMIS—then considered a better practice example on the continent. By November 2005, Malawi was in the process of adopting the off the shelf Epicor system in place in Tanzania. The system was considered successful until a corruption scandal in 2013 revealed that it had long-standing gaps and was vulnerable to the same political interference as the prior system had been. Interestingly, reviews in Tanzania had found similar deficiencies in their system (which had been the 'learning case').

⁴ The narrative in this brief case study emerges from research into the topic derived from a variety of sources, including (Matt Andrews, 2013c; Duravall & Erlandsson, 2005; Fölscher, Mkandawire, & Faragher, 2012; Khan & Pessoa, 2010; MEPD, 2004)

Malawi has pursued reforms in the public financial management (PFM) domain since the mid-1990s. Its early reforms involved work with the World Bank on an integrated financial management information system (IFMIS). This system was intended to computerise the financial management of government, improving the efficiency of spending and enhancing controls and accountability. A change in government occurred in 2004, on the heels of a corruption crisis that pointed to major gaps in the PFM domain. Malawi underwent a government-wide peer review at this time—as part of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). A large team of ex officials and consultants from other African countries undertook the review, and the IFMIS came under particular scrutiny. The review identified a long list of 21 issues needing attention in the existing system, noting that failure to address these issues would result in continued vulnerability for government. The main failures centred on a lack of core functions in the system—focused especially on internal control deficiencies and gaps in coverage. Importantly, the review also noted that the system’s weaknesses arose because of political interference and management and implementation failures. Political incentives were seen to undermine reform potential and hurried and poorly designed implementation processes had led to poor training, gaps in licensing, and more.

“Under pressure to respond to this review, the government sent a team of officials to Tanzania in March 2005. The purpose was to conduct a study tour of the country and investigate the functionality of Tanzania’s IMFIS—then considered a better practice example in Africa. The team returned to Malawi and advised the government to adopt the Tanzanian system (an Epicor system), using Tanzanian consultants. This led to a decision to adopt the new system in May 2005 and hire the contractor in a rapid, sole source process.”

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example in Africa. The team returned to Malawi and advised the government to adopt the Tanzanian system (an Epicor system), using Tanzanian consultants. This led to a decision to adopt the new system in May 2005 and hire the contractor in a rapid, sole source process. By November 2005, the Epicor system went live (with commitment control and accounts payable modules) in five pilot sites. By July 2006 all national ministries headquarters were using these modules.

The system's rapid initial progress led to early gains in functionality. Government had greater control over fund flows, for instance, and borrowing declined (and borrowing costs decreased as well). These are common early gains that are as much associated with having a more rigid single treasury account as having an IFMIS. The system's gains and rollout slowed after these initial gains, however. A 2009 evaluation by the government itself found various concerns with the consultant contract and deficiencies with implementation of the system. These concerns echoed significantly the list of 21 issues in the 2004 review. The system still had coverage gaps, for instance, and internal controls were weak. The report also reflected on political and managerial challenges similar to those discussed in the 2004 review, noting that these had not been effectively addressed in the new IFMIS reforms. Reports in 2011 show that these concerns were still not receiving attention; with weak implementation of key modules (especially those required to introduce controls) and slow and partial inclusion of distributed spending agencies (and local governments), and limited coverage of a broad swathe of transactions (like procurement and development spending).

“The system’s gains and rollout slowed after these initial gains, however. A 2009 evaluation by the government itself found various concerns with the consultant contract and deficiencies with implementation of the system... Interestingly, Tanzania’s system came under scrutiny around this time as well, and similar deficiencies showed themselves.”

Interestingly, Tanzania's system came under scrutiny around this time as well, and similar deficiencies showed themselves. The system had not been rolled out to local

governments as effectively as planned and key modules were not in place (leaving similar gaps in controls and coverage). Reports pointed to political and managerial challenges that had not been addressed in Tanzania that also resembled those that festered in Malawi.

Unfortunately, Malawi's problems with the system went far beyond critical reports. In 2013, a corruption scandal erupted that was directly connected to the reforms. Government officials had manipulated the IFMIS and taken advantage of gaps in the system to steal millions of dollars. Called 'cashgate', the scandal had many consequences; it led to donors pulling money out of the country, legal action against various officials, and more. In the midst of the recriminations, many observers have offered thoughts about what went wrong. Most agree that the IFMIS itself cannot be blamed for its failures, but there have been many questions, about a variety of issues, including:

- If the pressure for a hurried response to the 2004 peer review undermined the necessary reflection by Malawian officials of the 'lessons' from its own past, carried in that review (and in other documents at the time);
- If the initial March 2005 study tour to Tanzania gave Malawian officials enough insight into how the system worked (and how it did not); or if the study tour was about diffusing a product rather than diffusing learning about that product;
- If the Malawian and Tanzanian officials could have worked more consistently together after March 2005 study tour to ensure reflection, learning and adaptation in the implementation process;
- If the Malawian officials could have used their own internal reviews more effectively to promote learning and adaptation;
- If the Peer Review mechanisms could have included more regular peer follow ups to assess whether reform responses actually addressed outstanding issues.

Looking back on this experience, it appears that history repeated itself in Malawi—with an IFMIS produced after 2004 that had many of the same deficiencies as the one that existed previously. Peer engagements that could have led to learning between these two experiences seemed to have a blunted impact at best. The peer review engagement seemed

to create pressure for hurried responses and was not then followed up by some ongoing interaction to ensure the responses were substantively effective. Faced with this pressure, the March 2005 study tour to Tanzania then brought Malawian officials into contact with peers in other countries, but with a very narrow agenda that focused more directly on finding a technical solution than on learning.

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South Africa

In 2004, Project Consolidate ran a program to help struggling municipalities improve their operational capacity. The Horizontal Learning Programme evolved at a similar time. It had a distinct peer review and learning component.⁵

Key message:

Peer review can be a powerful lever for peer learning, fostering real reform and change in the process. The peer reviews need to be carefully structured to have such an impact, however. They must be undertaken in context of established relationships, focused on issues that are of concern to participants, structured to foster learning and reflection, and well-resourced and closely supported.

South Africa underwent significant change after the 1994 elections that signalled an end to apartheid. The country decentralised through its new constitution shortly

⁵ For sources, see (Africa & Nicol; Matt Andrews, 2002; Lazin, Evans, Hoffmann-Martinot, & Wollmann, 2008). Project Consolidate and Hologram do not run any more.

thereafter. A raft of policy papers and laws on local government then followed, building an aggressive and demanding vision of what a local authority should do in the new country. Various reforms were envisaged to help facilitate the realisation of this vision. Unfortunately, it became obvious by the early 2000s that many localities would not be able to reach management and operational standards required for effectiveness.

The Horizontal Learning Program (Hologram) was born in this context. It was a locally led, but donor funded project that encouraged learning and sharing among South African municipalities. A key part of the program centred on creating networks of district and local municipalities. Members of the networks collaborated to learn from each other about operational and service delivery challenges. The networks had action plans tailored to the needs of members, all of which participated voluntarily and paid dues to be part of the exercise (such that the network was predominantly self-funded).

“The networks adopted a peer review program as part of the intervention. These reviews were conceptualised as ‘hands on events’ incorporating a five day evaluation exercise.”

The networks adopted a peer review program as part of the intervention. These reviews were conceptualised as ‘hands on events’ incorporating a five day evaluation exercise. An external facilitator organised each review, acting on an expression of interest by the focal authority. The review teams were chosen from councillors and officials in nearby municipalities or districts (depending on whether the focal authority was a municipality or district). This team would work alongside a selected team in the focal authority to conduct a benchmark analysis of operational capacity and performance. The benchmarking instrument was developed in an iterative and participatory manner by local government officials under the auspices of the South African Local Government Association (which managed the entire process, with authority and governance provided by a steering committee elected from network members).

The peer review process is deliberately designed to afford participants opportunities to exchange knowledge and learn from each other throughout the week of

engagement (and beyond). The review team splits into teams of 2 or 3, who work alongside home authority officials—fostering close and deep engagement at all times. Time is set aside each night for reflection and debriefing, in a facilitated session led by the review manager. This allows significant knowledge exchange and second-order learning, where peers can explore ideas that have already been exchanged, clarify these ideas, and explore potential applications of these ideas. These interactions lead to many joint activities in the post-review process (including peer-to-peer exchanges, coaching and mentoring, and study-tours). Peer reviews are published once finalised and accepted, and each focal municipality develops a public Improvement Plan as well.

“It is important to know that the peer review program is only one of the tools used to foster peer learning in Hologram. The network also holds plenary meetings, for instance, where experts do presentations on issues of common interest and recent peer reviews are discussed (to provide even broader reflection and diffusion of lessons). The plenary discussions also allow for reporting on the results of peer reviews, where members reflect on what was learned as well as how the process fostered improved reform performance.”

It is important to know that the peer review program is only one of the tools used to foster peer learning in Hologram. The network also holds plenary meetings, for instance, where experts do presentations on issues of common interest and recent peer reviews are discussed (to provide even broader reflection and diffusion of lessons). The plenary discussions also allow for reporting on the results of peer reviews, where members reflect on what was learned as well as how the process fostered improved reform performance. This community-based reporting provokes peer pressure and competition as well. It also allows for rumination on the peer review processes adopted and this is vital for constant iterative improvement of such process (including adjustments to the benchmarking mechanism).

Peer reviews have proved powerful in facilitating peer learning and municipal reform in this context. A few lessons appear vital when considering how and why they proved so effective, however:

- The reviews took place in the context of a closely connected membership network that had a common and focused agenda.
- The municipalities and districts in the networks chose to use peer reviews as the main method of engagement and learning.
- The network members were engaged in designing the benchmarking mechanism and had a clear voice in shaping and re-shaping this mechanism.
- Individuals in the municipalities and networks were clearly authorised and encouraged to participate and learn in the review processes.
- The peer review process was carefully designed to allow for constant learning, including reflection.
- The peer review process was structured to support post-review follow up activities, where peers could continue their engagements.
- The process was well resourced and closely supported (administration was handled by a third party, and finances were dealt with up-front).
- Expert organisation began well in advance of the peer review event, and was available to ensure follow up after the event as well.
- Evaluations of the process were quick and focused on the progress with both learning and reform results.

*Georgia*⁶

Georgia underwent a non-violent revolution in 2003. The revolution was bought on by many factors, including high levels of corruption in government and low levels of service delivery. One of the first reforms instituted after the revolution aimed at improving the Public Registry—making it easier to register land, property and more. Government officials

⁶ This draws on the Innovations for Successful Societies case on Georgia's registry (http://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/successfulsocieties/files/Policy_Note_ID109.pdf) and (World Bank, 2012a).

started the reform process with a clear idea of their reform goals but did not know exactly what to do to achieve these goals. They adopted a multi-pronged approach to finding and fitting reform solutions that incorporated some active peer learning initiatives. Some of the peer-to-peer learning experiences proved more useful than others and it was vital that the government officials could determine what was more useful to learn in this process.

Key message:

Peer learning can play an important role in the public sector reform process. For this to happen, however, it is very important that the reformers involved in peer-to-peer engagements have a clear idea of the goals they are trying to achieve as well as the contextual realities in which they are working. This awareness helps them act as empowered learners in the peer learning process, determining which lessons are most relevant and how the lessons might be translated back into the reform context. It is also important to engage groups in the peer learning, and to ensure these groups have processes in place to foster ongoing learning once they return to their home organisation. This fosters effective diffusion, adaptation and scaling of new ideas and lessons.

Jaba Ebanoidze took charge of the Public Registry after Georgia's Rose Revolution in 2003. Housed within the Ministry of Justice, the registry provided information about land, property rights and titling. It was a vital part of government, especially because the country needs foreign direct investment to promote growth and foreign investors needed information about land. Without an effective registry, no investor could attract capital or be sure of ownership of key assets.

The registry did not work well before the Rose Revolution. Procedures were very bureaucratic and there was a high level of corruption, with applicants to the registry having to pay bribes for even the most basic service. The new president, Mikheil Saakashvili, had previously been Minister of Justice and knew the deficiencies of this registry. That is why he appointed Ebanoidze, and charged him with cleaning the registry—making the process more efficient and less corrupt.

Ebanoidze and his staff had experience working with international non-governmental organisations and studying abroad, which gave them a clear sense of the end goal of reform. They even had an idea of the kind of metrics they wanted to improve—centred on lower waiting times, and better responsiveness. They also knew that other countries had achieved these kinds of improvements in prior reforms, so there were ‘peers’ to learn from. They did not, however, know which peers were the right ones to learn from or which practical solution they should adopt.

Armed with a clear goal and with a good understanding of their own capacity constraints (financial and skills), Ebanoidze and his staff began looking for fitted solutions. As part of this search, they engaged foreign consultants who had worked in other countries on similar challenges and they engaged in a variety of study visits to countries where they had heard about good practice examples. A small group went to examine the Swedish registry systems, for instance, and the systems of other countries in Western and Eastern Europe. They met with peers who worked in the same domain and learned about how other registries were organised and operated. They also learned about the history of the registries and of reforms in the countries visited.

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When these lessons were carefully considered, especially against the Georgian examples, Ebanoidze and his team quickly decided that Western European models were not appropriate for his country. These models had emerged over hundreds of years and relied on capacities and realities that were not evident in Georgia. However, there were better-fitted reforms in other Eastern European countries that caught the attention of Ebanoidze and his team. They found the peer learning in Estonia and other countries extremely useful, because of similarities between these contexts and Georgia and the fact

that the reforms were newly introduced (and hence more comparable). The examples in these contexts were largely technology-based reforms, which convinced Ebanoidze to use information technology as the basis for his reforms. Improving IT would help to improve the registry's efficiency, transparency, and corruption problems.

Ebanoidze and his team took the lessons from these peer visits back to Georgia and began designing and implementing reforms. He introduced a policy that required team members to share all ideas and plans in written form at all times. This served to create a record of options considered and ideas floated, which helped to ensure interactive learning among the group of peers that had been visiting other countries. Building on the reflections facilitated by this learning, his team developed a step-by-step plan for achieving the changes they wanted. Each step had a milestone or output benchmark associated with it, and the tasks were specifically assigned to different people in the office. Weekly meetings were held to monitor and discuss progress, and a full team process was instituted to ensure shared responsibility for results.

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The peer learning in this case occurred across and within borders; with ideas shared between countries and on-the-job peer learning happening within the registry itself. The Georgians were able to discern the value of lessons learned across countries given their clear ideas about both their goals and the problems they faced. They were able to ensure the diffusion, adaptation and implementation of lessons learned because of structured interactions in the registry after the study visits were over.

Annex 4: Focal areas of relevant literatures on peer engagement and learning

Consideration given to engaging groups of peers	Intermediate outcomes			Final outcome
	1. Peer group engagement adjusted for context	2. Peer group engagement mechanisms leading to sustained individual contacts	3. Sustained individual contacts leading to practical peer learning	4. Learning applied to create change at scale
Research literature unrelated to any particular peer engagement process	The most recent World Development Report cites evidence that group deliberation can deepen empirical basis for action (World Bank, 2014, p.183), consistent with findings that contestation can counter confirmatory bias. (Bächtiger & Gerber, 2014, p.116).		Various definitions of peer learning (Boud et al., 2001; Keijzer, 2013a). Broad requirements for effective peer learning identified (Adam et al., 2011; Griffiths et al., 1995; Heavey, 2006; Tosey, 1999). When the preconditions are met, then peer learning can be an effective method for conveying technical skills and for learning about how to undertake more continuous learning (Connor & Asenavage, 1994; Kimmins, 2013; Van der Veen, 2000; Willey & Gardner, 2010) but these findings are weighted towards further and higher education. (McLeay & Wesson) find that peer review mechanisms affect peer learning differently across different cultures.	
OECD peer reviews (general) ⁷	The OECD reached some conclusions about how to tailor peer reviews to country and sector context, but the evidence base is not clear (OECD, 2007)			Scepticism about the degree to which the peer reviews lead to constructive policy transfer (Pal, 2014).
OECD Public Governance Reviews	Some research on how OECD public governance reviews are structured (Mahon & McBride, 2008; Pal, 2012).			

⁷ For an overview of the various OECD peer review mechanisms, see (Pagani, 2002).

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OECD Development Assistance Committee Peer Reviews	Conclusion that reviews should be open and transparent, to enhance public trust in development policy (OECD, 2014)			Conflicting judgments. (Ashoff, 2013, p.1) noted that “over 90 percent of DAC members rated their policy impact as “medium to very high”... (with) 88 percent of recommendations... partly or fully implemented in the last two years. (King et al., 2012) conclude that DAC peer reviews tend to stop at the level of formal arrangements and would be enhanced by stronger empirics (OECD, 2008b).
EU peer reviews of labour market programs				Scepticism about the degree to which the peer reviews lead to constructive policy transfer (Casey & Gold, 2005)
Africa Peer Review Mechanism	Study distinguished between the political level of peers in the APRM and the technical level in the diverse reviews undertaken by different OECD Committees (NEPAD, 2015).			Research indicated limited implementation of recommendations (Bing-Pappoe, 2010).
World Bank Institute Knowledge Exchange				Case studies highlight that peer group engagements were successful in informing change in diverse sectors (World Bank Institute, 2013a, 2013b)
UNECE Environmental Performance Reviews				Case studies suggest that peer reviews were successful in incentivising policy change (Ad Hoc Working Group of Senior Officials, 2003)
UNCTAD Voluntary Peer Reviews on Competition Law and Policy				Case studies suggest that peer reviews were successful in incentivising policy change (2011)

Consideration given to engaging groups of peers	Intermediate outcomes			Final outcome
	1. Peer group engagement adjusted for context	2. Peer group engagement mechanisms leading to sustained individual contacts	3. Sustained individual contacts leading to practical peer learning	4. Learning applied to create change at scale
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (WTO)	Reviews lead to the provision of appropriate technical assistance (Joint Group on Trade and Competition, 2002)			Reviews have a “soft law” effect in socialising members towards each other’s attempts to avoid protectionism. “the Secretariat sometimes warns or expresses worries but never criticises Members explicitly, and never comments on their rights and obligations under the WTO agreements.” (Gerasimchuk, 2013, p. 7)
Papa Andina (a regional network of the International Potato Centre which promotes knowledge sharing in Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador)	Summary of evaluations of four workshops detailing how their structure has led to deep and sustained collaboration between participants (Thiele, Devaux, Velasco, & Manrique, 2013)			
Public Expenditure Management Peer-Assisted Learning Network (PEMPAL)	Evaluations of PEMPAL have found that the intermediate objectives were achieved in relation to all the Communities of Practice established within PEMPAL (Internal Audit, Budget and Treasury). The evaluations were optimistic but did not collect evidence that peer learning occurred systematically (as distinct from learning from experts) or that such learning facilitated change at scale (Folscher, 2009, 2012)			
Pacific Forum Compact Peer Reviews	Reviews are tailored to each country (Forum Secretariat, 2014)			
Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes				Reviews have a “soft law” effect in socialising members towards transparency and effective exchange of information for tax purposes (Gerasimchuk, 2013)

Annex 5: Do you have a community of practice to build upon?

Communities of Practice (CoPs) are usually network arrangements that bring people together who engage in common kinds of practice. For those not familiar with the idea of a community of practice, Wenger (n/d) sets out three structural elements common to these mechanisms:

- *A professional/technical/functional domain:* A community of practice is not merely a club of friends or a network of connections between people – it has an identity defined by a shared domain of interest and a shared competence within it, although that competence might not be evident to others not involved (e.g. the skills that human resource management staff learn on the job in keeping internal staff conflicts below the threshold requiring formal action).
- *A community:* Members engage in joint activities and discussions, help each other, and share information; they build relationships that enable them to learn from each other.
- *A practice:* Members of a community of practice are practitioners with a shared repertoire of experiences, stories, tools and ways of addressing recurring problems.

Skalicky & Brown (2009) have important insights about planning for peer learning. We adapt these to construct a list of the key questions to ask in advance of peer learning, about the potential existence of an overarching Community of Practice (COP).

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| Is there a clear overarching domain? | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• What is the domain – is it around professional, technical or functional roles and tasks - and why has it emerged?• How is the domain managed – how are boundaries and competencies within it defined?• Is the domain evolving?• Are there some lasting principles which underpin that domain?• What are the shared competences? |
| Is there a community? | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Are there shared interests or expertise that distinguishes a community within that domain?• Who are the de facto leaders of that community?• What are the existing activities and discussions through which the community operates?• Is there an established tradition of learning from each other? |
| Is there a practice? | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Whether or not members of that community see themselves as researchers or analysts, do they (also) see themselves as practitioners undertaking practical |

tasks?

- How do the members of the community develop shared practitioner resources: experiences, tools and ways of addressing problems?
- What opportunities for reflection on learning are built into the practice?

Shalicky & Brown (2009) also have useful thoughts about whether there is potential or need for a Peer Learning Community within the COP, which inform the following checklist of questions:

What would define the Peer Learning Community?

- What are the qualities of the people who will form your community?
- What are your guidelines for selecting or inviting members of the community?
- What are the processes for selecting/inviting your members?
- How are your guidelines and processes inclusive of diversity?
- What are the qualities of the people who will form your community?
- How would this add distinctive value to other initiatives within the larger Community of Practice?

How would this be managed?

- How will this be coordinated?
- How and where will this interaction take place?
- How will this be resourced?
- How will the contribution of other related organisations and communities be recognised?

What would make peer learning particularly effective?

- Who are the stakeholders in the peer learning? Who wants to learn and who wants the learning to be effective at achieving result at scale?
- What will be the characteristics of the interactions?
- How will existing leadership within the larger Community of Practice be recognised?

How could peer learning be evaluated?

- How will the quality of the interactions between peers be evaluated?
- How will the Peer Learning Community be evaluated?


Annex 6: Evaluating peer learner experience⁸

<p>1. Immediate value: What happened and what was my experience of it?</p>	<p>What were significant events? What happened? How much participation was there? What was the quality of the mutual engagement? Was it fun, inspiring, convivial? How relevant to me was the activity/interaction? With whom did I interact or make connections? Which connections are most influential on my own development?</p>
<p>2. Potential value: What has all this activity produced?</p>	
<p>a. How has my participation changed me?</p>	<p>Have I acquired new skills or knowledge? Has my understanding of the domain or my perspective changed? Do I feel more inspired by the work I do? Have I gained confidence in my ability to engage in practice?</p>
<p>b. How has my participation changed my social relationships?</p>	<p>What access to new people have I gained? Do I know them well enough to know what they can contribute to my learning? Do I trust them enough to turn to them for help? Do I feel less isolated? Am I gaining a reputation from my participation?</p>
<p>c. What access to resources has my participation given me?</p>	<p>Do I have new tools, methods, or processes? Do I have access to documents or sources of information I would not have otherwise?</p>
<p>d. What position has the community acquired?</p>	<p>Has the community changed the recognition of our expertise? Have we acquired a new voice through our collective learning?</p>
<p>e. How has participating transformed my view of learning?</p>	<p>Do I see opportunities for learning that I did not see before?</p>
<p>3. Applied value: What difference has it made to my practice/life/context?</p>	<p>Where have I used the products of the community/network? Where did I apply a skill I acquired? When did I leverage a community/network connection in the accomplishment of a task? Was I able to enlist others in pursuing a cause I care about? When and how did I use a document or tool that the community produced or made accessible? How was an idea or suggestion implemented? At what level -- individual, team/unit, organisation?</p>
<p>4. Realised value: What difference has it made to my ability to achieve what matters to me or other stakeholders?</p>	<p>What aspects of my performance has my participation in community/network affected? Did I save time or achieve something new? Am I more successful generally? How? What effect did the implementation of an idea have? Did any of this affect some metrics that are used to evaluate performance? What has my organisation been able to achieve because of my participation in community/network?</p>
<p>5. Reframing value: Has it changed my or other stakeholders' understanding and definition of what matters?</p>	<p>Has the process of social learning led to a reflection on what matters? Has this changed someone's understanding of what matters? Does this suggest new criteria and new metrics to include in evaluation? How has this new understanding affected those who have the power to define criteria of success? Has this new understanding translated into institutional changes? Has a new framework or system evolved or been created as a result of this new understanding?</p>

⁸ Based on (Wenger et al.) (available at <http://wenger-trayner.com/resources/publications/evaluation-framework/>) provides examples of indicators and qualitative approaches for answering these questions. (Sirnik et al., 2011) (available at <http://www.pempal.org/success-stories/>) provides an example of applying this framework for reflection on an overall peer-learning engagement

Annex 7: The PEMPAL peer learning evaluation mechanism

The first evaluation of the PEMPAL initiative offer a particularly clear framework to use in evaluating peer learning, based on this model (Folscher, 2009, p. iii):



The evaluation questions are based on a nested set of indicators:

1. **Indicators related to the input objectives:** At the bottom tier of the value chain the objectives detail a set of arrangements which are essential inputs towards a productive, sustainable and well-functioning network. The indicators listed below measure
 - Whether the secretariat and steering committee are effective
 - More active contacts of COPs and Steering Committee rate PEMPAL secretariat support satisfactory or highly satisfactory

- An operational website (criteria: up to date, functioning links, representative of COP activities/outputs; hits)
 - Regularity and attendance of Steering Committee Meetings
 - Whether the network has sufficient resources
 - Increase in real resources
 - Increase or no change in number of funders
 - Increase in real resource contributions from members (for future implementation)
 - Whether each COP has a committed membership who has ownership of the network
 - Increase / no decline in number of target countries participating in COP activities on average per year
 - Increase / no decline in number of active network individual contacts over period
 - Percentage of active individual contacts who believe they are able to influence network priority setting and have a sense of belonging to network
 - Whether the network has good governance
 - Existence of COP Strategy, annual activity plan and budget; degree of plan implementation
 - Network reports available as scheduled and distributed
 - Regularity and attendance of Leadership Group meetings
 - Active contacts of COPs rate COP leadership
2. **Indicators related to output objectives:** As a knowledge and peer learning network, for PEM PAL the output objective can however be broken down in two key dimensions in which achievement will contribute towards the network being judged as functioning well, being sustainable and being productive.
- A network (or COP) that connects well, in which information flows well and in which members collaborate:
 - Number of formal network events / opportunities for professional learning on average per year

- Average attendance of events by countries as a percentage of countries invited
 - Percentage of participating countries and individual contacts attending events who have attended previous events
 - Network density, centrality and diameter
 - A network with quality learning resources
 - Percentage of network contacts reporting that they use website and/or other learning resources more than 6 times a year
 - Percentage of network contacts that rate network resources as of quality or high quality
 - Percentage of event participants from participating countries who rate inputs at events as satisfactory or highly satisfactory
3. **Indicators that relate to the outcome network objective:** The strategic outcome network objective has been defined as PEM PAL members learning from each other and building their capacity to improve their PFM systems. The evaluation framework measures whether learning has taken place, measured as
- No of COP participating countries and individual contacts reporting using COP experiences in designing and recommending or implementing PFM improvements in their own organisations
 - No of contributions from COP individual contacts to PEM PAL website, COP events and learning resources and no of technical assistance missions to other participating countries
 - Development (for Internal Auditors and Treasury COPs) and percentage of a sample of countries using developed COP or existing benchmarking tools.
4. **Indicators that relate to the impact network objective:** The evaluation framework does not assume that improvements in PFM outcomes, as measured by the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) framework, can be attributed to the network's activities and outcomes. However, it does presuppose that its activities should contribute to improvements in PFM over time in a country. Therefore the network will track over time progress against key PFM outcomes

within countries (rather than across) that relate directly to the subject areas of each of the COPs. These are

- For the Budget COP
 - Classification of the budget (PEFA Indicator 5)
 - Comprehensiveness of information (PEFA indicator 6)
 - Orderliness and participation in the annual budget process (PEFA Indicator 11)
 - Multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting (PEFA Indicator 12)
- For the Treasury COP
 - Stock and monitoring of expenditure payment arrears (PEFA indicator 4)
 - Recording and management of cash balances, debt and guarantees (PEFA indicator 16)
 - Predictability in the availability of funds for commitment of expenditures (PEFA indicator 17)
 - Timeliness and regularity of accounts reconciliation (PEFA indicator 22)
- For the Internal Audit COP
 - Effectiveness of payroll controls (PEFA indicator 18)
 - Effectiveness of internal controls for non-salary expenditure (PEFA indicator 20)
 - Effectiveness of internal audit (PEFA indicator 21)

Annex 8: A glossary of terms and terminology

Key terms

AADP	Africa-Asia Drought Risk Management Peer Assistance Network
CAN	OECD Anti-Corruption Network (Eastern Europe and Central Asia)
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AfCoP	African Community of Practice on Managing for Development Results
AfriTAC	IMF African Technical Assistance Centres
ANCPI	National Agency for Cadastre and Property Registration (Romania)
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AREC	Macedonia Agency for Real Estate Cadaster
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development (now DFAT)
BPSR	Bureau of Public Sector Reforms (Nigeria)
CABRI	Collaborative African Budget Reform Initiative
CAFRAD	African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development
CEF	Centre for Excellence in Finance (Slovenia)
CHU	Central Harmonisation Unit (Hungary)
CLEAR	Centres for Learning on Evaluation And Results
COP	Community of Practice
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)
DG	Director General
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIP	Effective Institutions Platform
EU	European Union
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
GoPemPal	Government Performance Management Peer Assisted Learning (India)
GoV	Government of Vietnam
GPEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
HR	Human resources
IAACA	International Association of Anticorruption Authorities
IACOP	PEMPAL Internal Audit Community of Practice
IFC	International Financial Corporation
INROSAI	International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions
INTRAC	International NGO Training and Research Centre
IPAC	Institute of Public Administration of Canada
IPPIS	Integrated Payroll and Personnel Information System (Nigeria)
IT	Information Technology
LEND	Club de Madrid network for “Leaders Engaged in New Democracies”
METT	Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (South Africa)
M of LGRD&C	Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives (Bangladesh)
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoLISA	Ministry of Labour, Invalids, and Social Affairs (Vietnam)
NANA	Gambia’s National Nutrition Agency
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NQI	National Quality Infrastructure (Uzbekistan)
OBB	Outcome-based Budgeting
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PALS	World Vision Project Model Accelerated Learning and Support
PATH II	Land Administration Program Second Phase (Honduras)
PEMNA	Public Expenditure Management Network in Asia
PEMPAL	Public Expenditure Management Peer Assisted Learning network

PFM	Public financial management
PIC Systems	Public Internal Control systems (EU).
PISA	OECD Programme for International Student Assessment
R4D TAP	Results for Development Transparency and Accountability Program
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
SP	Social Protection
STAREP	Strengthening Auditing and Reporting in the Countries of the Eastern Partnership)
SWFs	Sovereign Wealth Funds
TAXGIP	Tax Administrators eXchange for Global Innovative Practices
TCI	The global practitioners network for competitiveness, clusters and innovation
UZstandart	National agency responsible for NQI (Uzbekistan)
WAHO	West African Health Organisation
WOP Africa Project	Water Operators Partnership, African Development Bank

Key terminology

Community of Practice	Groups of people who, despite geographical distance, share a concern or a passion for something that they do and generally seek to learn how to do it better as many of them interact regularly (adapted from (Wenger, n/d, p.1). Communities of practice comprise: a professional/technical/functional domain (they are not merely a club of friends or a network of connections between people and have an identity defined by a shared interest and set of competences); a community (members engage in joint activities and build relationships that enable them to learn from each other); and a practice (members are practitioners with a shared repertoire of experiences, stories, tools and ways of addressing recurring problems) (Wenger, n/d).
Facilitated peer group engagement	Actively bringing together groups of potential peers, selected on criteria such as function or professional affiliation.
Facilitating organisations	The groups or organisations that are supporting peer group engagement.
Knowledge generation	Producing and promoting some kind of knowledge to share.
Learning Alliances	Collaborative multi-stakeholder groupings of institutions/organisations that are willing to actively share experiences on and approaches to public sector reforms, using different peer learning tools and methods to engage with each other over time through continuous, mutual learning about effective approaches to public sector reform and what makes peer learning processes successful (GPEDC, 2014).
Learning tools	Devices or techniques used during peer engagements, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Modes of meeting such as: large group meetings (like annual workshops); small group meetings (where only a few peers engage in more close-quarters engagement than an annual conference would allow); online and virtual engagement mechanisms and telecommunication devices (allowing peers to connect outside of face-to-face contexts). • Focus areas for discussion such as: externally produced knowledge products (like expert papers on different budgeting reforms); common assessment products (review templates); expert group reviews (where external experts analyse reviews); peer-produced knowledge products • Shared experiences such as site visits (where different delegations can visit others to learn first-hand about new ideas); • Formal training sessions.
Peer contracts	Soft contracts to foster commitment by individuals and their organisations to work together, attend peer meetings, communicate regularly, and to apply lessons learned in one's own organisation.

Peer group engagement	Groups of potential peers, selected on criteria such as function or professional affiliation, brought together.
Peer interaction logistics	Organisational challenges facing peer group facilitators, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensuring peers have the time to engage with peers (at face-to-face events); • Ensuring peers have means, time to engage with peers (after face-to-face events); • Finding the appropriate venues for face-to-face peer engagement; and • Finding the appropriate media for non-face-to-face peer engagement.
Peer learning	Public officials or other practitioners with some responsibility for reform design gaining practical insights into technical reform options and tactical modes of implementation from each other.
Peer learning communities of practice	Specific professional, technical or functional domains which peer learners may focus on within their overall peer learning (e.g. the Budget, Internal Audit and Treasury communities of practice within PEMPAL (Folscher, 2009, 2012).
Peer learning community	A group of people within a larger community of practice who come together to learn from each other.
Peer learning goals	Specified measures of the degree to which intermediate and final objectives have been achieved. <p>Intermediate objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peer group foundational engagement established; • Peer group engagement mechanisms lead to sustained individual contacts; • Sustained individual contacts lead to practical peer learning. <p>Final objective: Peer learning applied to create change at scale.</p>
Peer reviews	A process by which a country or an agency assesses its performance against a set of benchmarks with the assessment often facilitated, and always ultimately reviewed, by a panel of country/agency peer experts. Peer reviews are a “facilitated peer group engagement” and are generally intended to assist in setting an agenda for reform, but that does not necessarily refer to improving the knowledge and skills or specific senior staff through sustained individual level contact – although it might. Thus peer reviews may or may not lead to peer learning and skill-building at the individual level. Peer reviews at the country level are an example of “soft modes of governance” by which policy dialogue is pursued and a general “best practice” agenda set, without any particular concern to develop individual skills.
Peer selection	The development and use of criteria for selecting and connecting peers with similar profiles.
Reflection mechanisms for application and diffusion	Discussion and review of efforts to ensure that lessons learned by individuals are actually reinforced and taken to scale.
Sharing forward	Ensuring lessons learned go beyond the individual to their home organisation.
Theory of change	“(T)he rationale behind an... intervention, describing the relationships – and identifying the assumed links – between activities and desired outcomes. It shows a series of expected consequences...” (Dart, Hall, & Rudland, 2010, p.17).
Transformational change in the public sector	Significant improvements in public sector capacity envisaged by the post-Busan process and specifically implied by the negotiation of the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals.

Annex 9: Ideas to employ in different stages of the peer learning process

The mapping exercise and associated experiments helped to provide a general view on the field of practice in which peer learning occurs. This view was not always detailed in terms of methods and practices, however. This annex draws on some ideas embedded in the mapping and experiments and other sources to flesh out some ideas to employ in different stages of the peer learning process. Readers will note that the lettering of each section is consistent with the lettering used in the related document, “Questions (and Ideas) to Guide Peer Learning.”

A. Strategising through a “theory of change” to help in determining if this is for you

Facilitating organisations make various assumptions about why learning achieved by a group of peers would make a significant difference in the functioning of the public sectors of diverse countries. The constructed idea is called a theory of change. It has three major dimensions: A focal point (what is being influenced); Influential variables (what you are using to create the influence); and assumptions that link the variables to the focal point.

The APRM, for instance, espouses a theory of change in which peer relationships enhance accountability for reforms and open up channels for knowledge transfer to enhance reform designs and improve the likelihood and quality of reform implementation.

It is vital to have a clear idea of what the theory of change looks like in any peer learning event or process, as this helps to draw peers to participate, influences design of the process, and determines how it should be evaluated. The theory of change will also shed some light on whether or not peer learning actually gets reformers where they need to get to (if it is the right tool to use in effecting change).

B. Fostering peer engagement

Tools to use in engaging peers

Group meetings: Large group meetings are very widely used. The PEMPAL initiative, for instance uses many tools including large group meetings (like annual workshops). Small group meetings (where only a few peers engage in more close-quarters engagement) are used by the Africa-Asia Drought Risk Management Peer Assistance Network (AADP).

Common assessment products: Over 35% of the group of initiatives surveyed used common assessment products (like the APRM and OECD review mechanisms, or report cards used in the R4D-TAP program on transparency) as a tool for focusing discussion and stimulating continuing engagement in the initiative. Others using this approach include INTRAC's Peer Learning Programme for Small and Diaspora Organisations, the African Development Bank's WOP Africa Project, and MENA-OECD Procurement Network.

Externally/peer produced knowledge products as focus for convening: Expert papers and other knowledge products are also very widely used as tools to engage interest. For example expert papers on different budgeting reforms and sponsored written reports or studies by consultants, academics and other experts.

Training sessions: Training events (often tied to some kind of certification process, especially where the peer groups are professionally affiliated such as accountants and auditors) is again a commonly used tool. Training goals tends to be emphasised in initiatives associated with professions or other certification bodies like the various associations of auditors and accountants. The training activities have stand-alone value for individuals (and their organisations) but can also provide opportunities for peer engagement and relationship building, and offer ways of framing more flexible follow-up peer learning connections. For instance, one of respondents noted that they attended a public financial management (PFM) training event to get a new certificate but met new peers at the event and stayed connected for many months afterwards. Training like this is a key aspect of the peer learning initiatives facilitated by STAREP (Strengthening Auditing and Reporting in the Countries of the Eastern Partnership and in the peer engagements offered by Transparency International's School on Integrity).

Expert group peer review: The OECD and NEPAD peer review modalities are perhaps the best known use of these tools, essentially entailing a panel of outside specialists using an assessment tool to examine a 'peer' system. OECD public governance peer reviews are intended to assist in setting an agenda for reform, delineating the types of developments emerging in other OECD countries but that does not necessarily refer to improving the knowledge and skills or specific senior staff through sustained individual level contact – although it might. About a quarter of the initiatives examined used such reviews (p.31).

Experiment 4 suggests that formal peer reviews might not be very strong motivators for sustained contact. They can lead to broad strategy advice rather than the practical problem-solving which peers seek unless they are accompanied by some specific mechanisms for maintaining contact after the review is complete.

Single/multi peer self-assessment: Individual peer review processes entail a single person assessing systems using a common assessment tool. The APRM uses single-peer country self-assessments and expert group peer review (where one country assesses its performance against a set of benchmarks and this assessment is then reviewed by a high-profile panel of peer experts). The R4D TAP process involves a multi-peer self-assessment, bringing individuals together from organisations involved in tackling corruption and having all of them fill out a report card of their performance. Others using self-assessment include the Results for Development Transparency and Accountability Program (R4D TAP).

Selection and matching

Experiment 1 (on matching) in this study suggests that selection and matching needs particular attention: (i) The most effective peer learning tends to happen in the groups where peers had pre-identified the same type of problem – but distilling out a functional problem requires considerable time and attention; (ii) Matching on the basis of formal position can produce positive learning results and can lead to peer mentoring based on experience as well as sharing approaches for responding to common problems; (iii) Matching on the basis of common tasks and policies seems least effective.

Building trust in the foundational engagements

The limiting factor to any effective inter-personal engagement is trust. Assuming that interests have been matched, or that interests which match have been found, the factor most likely to deter effective initial engagement is trust. Trust is about confidence: that discussions which reveal uncertainty, doubt or lack of technical knowledge will not be shared widely; that focus areas will continue to be relevant; and that their home organisation will support their participation for the long term. That trust is crucial when thinking about creating the relational context needed to foster effective peer learning. Without trust, and of course willingness to learn and engage, individuals are unlikely to be effective participants in a peer learning process.

Trust is built and maintained over time. Facilitators need to first engage commitment in peers and then foster committed connections over weeks, months, and even years. The challenge is partly about the individuals themselves and partly about their organisations (especially where initiatives engage individuals through organisations). Playing the “Blind Side” game (Gray, Brown, & Macanuso, 2010, Ch. 6), or other similar team exercises, can be useful in fostering trust in foundational engagements.

Box 8.1: The “Blind Side” Game

- Before the meeting, decide on a topic for discussion. Draw a large-scale profile of a person and draw four arrows coming out of the top of the head. Label those arrows “Know/ Know”, “Know (that they) Don’t Know”, “Don’t Know (but probably do) Know”, and “(suspect that they) Don’t Know (that they) Don’t Know”.
- Give the players access to sticky notes and markers and tell them that the game is to try to make explicit the knowledge they have, and the knowledge they don’t have but could use.
- Start with the Know/ Know category. Elicit from the group all information about the topic that they know they know. This category should go quickly and should generate a lot of content. Ask the players to write one bit of knowledge per sticky note and cluster them near the arrow pertaining to that category. (They’ll do this for each category.)
- Next, tackle Know/ Don’t Know. This will go less quickly than the first but should generate plenty of content. Again, ask them to cluster sticky notes near the related arrow.
- Move to Don’t Know/ Know. This information could be skills people have that are currently not used to solve problems or untapped resources that have been forgotten. Last, move to Don’t Know/ Don’t Know. The group will be stopped here, possibly indefinitely. This category is where discovery and shared exploration take place. Ask the players provocative questions: What does this team know that your team doesn’t know it doesn’t know? How can you find out what you don’t know you don’t know?
- Ask the group what they can do to proactively address the distinct challenges of each category. Discuss insights and “aha’s”. Even if the players’ only revelation is that they have blind spots, this in itself can be a fruitful discovery.

Gray et al. (2010, pp.203-4) also have ideas about fostering trust building behaviors, which can employed in foundational engagements.

Box 8.2: Trust-building behaviours

Talk Straight

- Be honest. Tell the truth. Let people know where you stand. Use simple language. Call things what they are. Demonstrate integrity. Don't manipulate people or distort facts. Don't spin the truth. Don't leave false impressions.

Create Transparency

- Tell the truth in a way people can verify. Get real and genuine. Be open and authentic. Err on the side of disclosure. Operate on the premise of "What you see is what you get." Don't have hidden agendas. Don't hide information.

Clarify Expectations

- Disclose and reveal expectations. Validate them. Renegotiate them if needed and possible. Don't violate expectations. Don't assume that expectations are clear or shared.

Practice Accountability

- Hold yourself accountable. Hold others accountable. Take responsibility for results. Be clear on how you'll communicate how you're doing— and how others are doing. Don't avoid or shirk responsibility. Don't blame others or point fingers when things go wrong.

Keep Commitments

- Make commitments carefully; keep them at almost all costs; or communicate and renegotiate if you absolutely can't. Making and keeping commitments is a symbol of honour. Don't break confidences.

Peer learners also mentioned the use of peer contracts to foster commitment by individuals and their organisations. The brief descriptions of these contracts suggested a focus on working together, attending peer meetings, communicating regularly, and applying lessons learned in one's own organisation. These contracts are symbolic and are obviously difficult to enforce. However, they provide some basis for facilitators to set expectations of the peer participants, which is particularly useful when establishing sustained individual contacts by specific peers. Sharing extracts from Ayres (2010) could be a useful starting point for a peer community discussion of the nature of any contracts that community members might want to make.

Box 1: Commitment contracts

Commitment contracts do not try to price the pains and pleasures of others. They try, instead, to create an offer that can't be rejected— or, for Godfather fans, an offer that's too good to refuse. Dr. Lisa Sanders, the Diagnosis columnist for The New York Times Magazine, recently celebrated the twentieth year of a smoking pledge she made with a friend who was also trying to quit. If either one smokes a cigarette, they promise to pay the other \$ 5,000. They started by putting \$ 1,000 at risk but increased their stakes as their wealth increased. Lisa Sanders didn't choose a penalty of \$ 5,000 because she wanted her future self to seriously weigh the benefits and costs of smoking. The offer not to smoke is too good to refuse. Or, if you like, the offer to smoke is too bad to accept. Sanders wanted to create a substantial enough penalty that she would not have to think about it. Economic incentives are all about guiding people to make better choices, but commitment contracts are about removing and reducing choices. Giving your CEO stock options is an incentive contract; giving your friend five grand if you smoke a cigarette is a commitment. So far the contract has worked to perfection. Lisa and her friend have both been smoke-free for more than seventy-three hundred days. Even though they've long since kicked the habit, they see no reason why they shouldn't keep the contract in place— just in case they're ever tempted to backslide. (Ayres, 2010, Kindle Locations 681-692)

C. Fostering sustained individual contacts

Tools

Tools commonly used at this stage of peer learning include the following:

Paired engagements: The survey of peer learners indicated that specifically matched individuals were the peers from whom lessons are most effectively gleaned. 60% of the surveyed peer learners referred to such individuals when identifying who they see as a 'peer' and when describing the peers with (and from) whom they had learned in the past (p.25). Pairing can be on the basis of having shared (i) problems, challenges and struggles, (ii) goals, (iii) tasks, (iv) social standing, (v) career levels, and (vi) education levels. In creating paired engagements, facilitator organisations gather information on peers using mini surveys that ask about these 'matching factors' and then work to connect peers with similar profiles. In the peer learning experience centred on social protection in Vietnam, for

instance, an emergent lesson centred on the importance of selecting “Participants from a knowledge receiving country ... based on their degree of influence over reforms and the programs addressed by the exchange.” A key lesson after the peer learning initiative intended to help Uzbekistan with its exports was to select peers that have “pursued similar goals in the face of similar challenges.”

A challenge here is that facilitators must also depend on the participating countries and organisations to keep the individuals in their positions for long enough to build relationships necessary for effective relationship building between peers. Frequent changes in the representation of different organisations, due to staff turnover or other factors, undermines this relationship building and frustrates the peer learning process.

Online networking and virtual/telecom engagement: Only a relatively small proportion of peer learning facilitators used online and virtual engagement mechanisms and telecommunication devices (allowing peers to connect outside of face-to-face contexts) (p.31). One example is the recent support by the IMF’s African Technical Assistance Centres (AfriTAC) to countries concerned about low growth is an example. Delegates from various countries met at an initial conference held in November 2014 in Mauritius. They then engaged with each other using ‘cost effective knowledge tools, including online’ communications devices. A second example is World Vision’s internal Project model Accredited Learning and Support program, which employs online mechanisms to facilitate learning by peers, blending training and less structured peer-to-peer interaction.

Peer produced knowledge products as focus for discussion: Peer-produced knowledge products can include case studies of a peer’s own experience or, less formally, small group meetings where only a few peers engage in more close-quarters engagement than a larger meeting would allow (p.29). The Africa-Asia Drought Risk Management Peer Assistance Network (AADP) provides useful examples.

Site visits: Site visits allow different delegations to visit others to learn first-hand about new ideas. About a third of the initiatives surveyed use site visits (p.30). These visits were sometimes one-sided (where PEMPAL, for instance, sponsors a visit of various ministry of finance officials to another country) or reciprocal (where officials from two countries might visit each other’s context and compare notes on the site visits). For example, ‘in-field exchange events’ are facilitated by the Africa-Asia Drought Risk

Management Peer Assistance Network (AADP). These events bring peers together on study tours and targeted seminars to learn directly from each other's experiences.

Joint peer activities: Joint peer activities can take a variety of forms. They attempt to engage peers in common projects intended to foster creativity and discovery of new ways of thinking. Examples include the Horizontal Learning Program in Bangladesh, which involves peers in hands-on projects to ensure knowledge is tested and disseminated while on-the-job, and the World Bank Knowledge Hubs.

Experiment 2 suggests that joint peer activities can be powerful, but: Sharing lessons tends to happen only after individuals develop some trust and camaraderie; Time matters: over time, the barriers and inhibitions of working across organisational boundaries can diminish – and the process of further refining the functional problem and reviewing progress made in ameliorating it can intensify; The perceived legitimacy of knowledge offered to peers affects their willingness to take it seriously, particularly when the insights are seen to come from more junior officials; the challenge is to find a way around the catch-22 situation where those who are going to learn the most may be the least capable of fostering diffusion; When learning across countries, peers should be engaged over the longer-term and should be asked to help with reform implementation not just with reform design or objectives; mutuality of learning between peers yields effective reform, rather than one-way advice from an external peer to passive internal reformers.

Community publications: Publications which can involve the entire group in their production and which are also of value to the group can be a very powerful tool for ensuring continued meaningful contact. For example, PEMPAL IACOP is elaborating and publishing knowledge products which are also very useful (e.g. Internal Audit Manual, Risk Assessment in Audit Planning, Quality Assurance etc.).

Momentum matters, and can be maintained

As noted above, the physical peer group meetings and activities are generally the centre-piece of the peer learning strategy – the regional or quarterly meetings, the study visits, on-line workshops etc. However, it is important not to rely on these formal, episodic events to

carry the weight of the peer learning community. There are several strategies available for maintaining momentum outside of these expensive and logistically demanding activities:

Focusing on an array of peer learning communities of practice within the overall peer engagement, each with a life of its own and with relatively narrow topics, can ensure that there is a broader base for interactions and that not all the eggs are placed in the quarterly meeting basket. They can be self-organised or organised by the facilitators outside of the formal meeting round. They can mitigate risks that participants drop out because they move position.

Peers should be encouraged to keep working together through tools that facilitate continued interaction (like paired engagements, online networking and virtual engagements). Other tools can facilitate new knowledge creation through the sustained individual contacts (with knowledge emerging through site visits and joint peer activities, for instance). New knowledge should be shared and exchanged through mechanisms that are ongoing and repeated, and continuous reflection exercises help to solidify lessons and promote application and diffusion by peers in their organisations and countries. There is now evidence on the effectiveness of on-line learning and engagement (Harris & Nikitenko†, 2014). (Wenger, 2001) sets out a useful summary of the technological platforms available to support communities of practice and peer learning. Although somewhat dated, it provides a useful start.

Learning tools can be assembled in different combinations and adjusted over time. Recent support by the IMF's African Technical Assistance Centres (AfriTAC) to countries concerned about low growth (Kireyev, 2015; Leigh & Mills, 2014). Delegates from various countries met at an initial conference held in November 2014 in Mauritius. They then engaged with each other using 'cost effective knowledge tools, including online' communications devices. A smaller set of delegations met again in February 2015 in Senegal, and an even more select group of 'comparator countries' continue to work together on 'an active peer learning effort' that is slated to include site visits and joint activities.

Consultation amongst members of the peer learning community is not just a passive exercise intended to prepare the ground for the next formal meeting – it is also a mechanism for maintaining dialogue and for providing a framework for on-line or informal

comment between peer group members. Examples of this can be found in the approach taken to defining topics for attention in the Demand for Good Governance Peer Learning Network, where peers were contacted through a listserv and asked to refine broad topics for group meetings (Chase & Anjum, 2008) and in the research on the kinds of problems peers commonly face as undertaken in the preparation for the International Financial Corporation 2009 peer event on *Doing Business* reforms (IFC, 2010).

D. Fostering actual peer learning

Using research evidence

In the classroom situation, stimulating students' interest in the content of the course is the most powerful predictor of the overall ratings of the teacher, and the fourth most powerful predictor of student achievement (Feldman, 2007). Research in the medical field has shown that busy practitioners can be motivated to look at new and emerging research findings through providing access to findings in easily digestible formats (Morténus, 2014). The key in that example was to set targets for the supply of emerging research findings to key personnel in three formats: oral (ensuring that the staff had access to research seminars and other events, these can be on-line); written (circulation of easy-to-read research bulletins and reports) and digital (access to summarised material on websites). In all cases, the content had a popular science format rather than a purely scientific perspective. The result was that interest in research increased and was sustained over a long time frame (12 years). Developing a "Context Map" (Gray et al., 2010, Ch. 5) can be a useful way of setting out what is known about emerging research and highlighting the significance of current knowledge and knowledge gaps.

Facilitating meaningful and inclusive conversations

There is a host of advice on how to facilitate meaningful conversations. (Brown & Isaacs, 2005) provide general guidelines, emphasising the significance of building confidence and ensuring that all are heard. (Weisbord & Janoff, 2010) provides specific approaches for

setting the agenda and structuring conversations purposefully. (Scharmer, 2009c) offers useful insights into open-minded leadership of facilitated engagements – an approach which is translated into some very practical guidance for preparing for site visits (Scharmer, 2009b)⁹ and for learning from case studies (Scharmer, 2009a).¹⁰

Including formal training within peer activities

Many peer learners note the value of combining more directed and specific training activities (sometimes tied to certification) with other peer learning activities. The training activities have stand-alone value for individuals (and their organisations) but could also provide opportunities for peer engagement and relationship building, and offer ways of framing more flexible follow-up peer learning connections. Training like this is a key aspect of the peer learning initiatives facilitated by STAREP (Strengthening Auditing and Reporting in the Countries of the Eastern Partnership). Peers are engaged in a community of practice where they can learn interactively but also receive formal training and receive certificates of achievement. This is crucial in peer networks focused on professional groups (like accountants and auditors, in this case, or experts on anticorruption in the case of Transparency International's School on Integrity).

Approaches for evaluating the achievement of the learning objectives

All development professionals have encountered situations where a knowledge-sharing event is driven more by form than by function. The case studies highlight the danger of study tours which seem to entail more shopping than knowledge exchange. Learning does not automatically flow from facilitated peer engagements. Peer learning involves many different tools with many considerations entailed in developing the right mix to meet the different challenges.

One key to ensuring that sustained contact leads to learning is to recognise that events are transitory but learning is longer term; peer learning is seldom achieved in a one-

⁹ Available at https://www.presencing.com/sites/default/files/tools/PI_Tool_SensingJourneys.pdf

¹⁰ Available at https://www.presencing.com/sites/default/files/tools/PI_Tool_CaseClinic.pdf.

off event. This was apparent from the peer learner surveys where over three quarters of respondents noted that their most memorable peer learning experience took place over a few weeks or more. Some of the experiences seemed to be ‘quick and thick’—where peers met at some event and then engaged daily or weekly for a few weeks or month via a mix of site visits, telephone or email engagements, and more. Other experiences seemed to be longer and more drawn out, however, with 45% of the respondents noting that their most memorable peer learning experiences lasted for one year or more and involved multiple interactions. These peers seemed to meet at some forum and then engaged over many months and even years in a process of continuing connection that included paired engagements (where peers were matched in pairs), site visits, and joint activities.

The implication is that, like the learning process itself, evaluating the degree to which the learning objectives have been met should not be a one-off exercise. Frequent, relatively light, tools can be used regularly.

The Public Expenditure Management Peer Assisted Learning network (PEMPAL) provides an example of how to assess learning gains. One of the mechanisms they use is Etienne Wenger’s questions to evaluate learning in communities of practice (Sirnik, Lautar, & Maver, 2011, p.10):

- What is the most meaningful PEM PAL activity that you have participated in and your experience of it (e.g., conversation, a working session, a project, etc.)?
- Please describe a specific resource this activity produced for you (e.g., and idea or document) and why you thought it might be useful.
- Please tell how you used this resource in your practice.
- How did this affect your personal success?
- Has your participation contributed to the success of your organisation?

The African Transitional Justice Research Network also provide useful examples of assessing peer learning gains (Hamber, 2008). They survey ‘members’ of the network to track the usefulness of web-based resources in fostering supportive interactions and research skills and capacity. The World Bank South-South ‘Results Stories’ (<http://wbi.worldbank.org/sske/results>) also provide examples on how to evaluate more direct peer learning gains.

Tools to develop reflection

Reflection is a key part of improving the effectiveness of individual learning and of providing guidance on the overall impact of the peer learning community so that strategy and direction can be improved for the future. Research has shown that taking time away from the process of training and reallocating that for reflection on what has been learned significantly enhances the learning (Di Stefano, Gino, Pisano, & Staats, 2014). Reflection tools identified in the mapping included processes where individual peers were asked to note what they had learned from other peers and how they would act on these lessons. Multiple-peer reflection tools were used by about 10% of facilitators and included efforts to get peers discussing their lessons with each other, often aiming to foster the common identification of positive deviance processes and ideas (that promote better results in some peers and could be replicated by all peers). For example, the WHO Peer Learning District Initiative (<http://www.afro.who.int/en/tanzania/press-materials/item/6590-who-improves-district-health-service-delivery-through-the-peer-learning-district-initiative.html>) gathers peers from different health clinics together to benchmark their organisations, discuss the benchmarking results, visit those clinics with the best results, and then discuss (together, as a group) what they saw as the keys to success and how these ideas might be diffused.

However, the mapping found that, despite its proven significance, facilitators seldom employ explicit reflection tools to ensure that lessons are effectively understood by individual peer learners and structured to ensure that the learning is suitable and relevant for application back in their home context. Reed & Koliba (1995)¹¹ provides some excellent tools for open reflection.

E. Diffusing lessons from peers to their organisations

Establishing links between the peer learning and the home context

Building commitment to take lessons home among peers participating in learning initiatives is fundamental. One approach is that peers participating in events could be

¹¹ Available at http://www.uvm.edu/~dewey/reflection_manual/

required to interact with groups in their home organisations before and after learning events, and contracts with peers could even require them to do this. Peers could be urged to work with colleagues in their home organisations when they contribute to ideas about the topics to be addressed in peer learning initiatives. The same peers could be then be required to do presentations on these topics when they return to their home organisations. These engagements could be included as part of the evaluation of peer learning efforts.

It is very possible that some countries and organisations send peers to events with no expectation of broad impact afterwards. There may be no infrastructure in place in the home organisation to allow lesson diffusion, including time, money and facilities. But there are examples of facilitated initiatives that pay serious attention to this issue of diffusion:

The Horizontal Learning Program in Bangladesh, for instance, provides peer learning opportunities for officials from regional and local governments (LGRD&C, 2008). The opportunities were not limited to individuals, however, with teams from different governments engaged together in a variety of activities (including benchmarking, site visits, and knowledge sharing events). The program also includes pre-planned dissemination events to ensure that lessons learned are widely communicated.

The Transparency and Accountability in Budgeting Peer Assisted Learning Network (EFCA, 2013) inspired by the regional Public Expenditure Management Peer Assisted Learning (PEMPAL) initiative, found that public financial management officials at the centre of government benefited from peer learning gains. They noted however that the lessons learned from other countries were not trickling down to regional and local governments, however, where there was even weak transmission of lessons about positive deviance, where local governments were performing better than average because of home-grown solutions.

World Vision's Internal Project Model Accredited Learning and Support Program (Harwood & Gough, 2012) is an online community learning approach for World Vision economic development programming staff based in the field. It employs online mechanisms to facilitate learning by peers (blending training and less structured peer-to-peer interaction), which is cost effective and which allows for the different time-zones, travel commitments, and connectivity issues whilst also ensuring that they benefit from being part of an online interactive community learning together.

The African Community of Practice on Managing for Development Results (AfCoP) uses a variety of tools and mechanisms to foster diffusion of learning from core groups of peers to others. These include sub-regional meetings and national chapters of the CoP. These are “autonomous bodies, launched at the initiative of senior-level government officials and linked to national processes”. A national chapter in Niger was started by a member of the full AfCoP, who “mobilised 300 civil servants, representatives of civil society, the private sector, and development agencies, whom at the end of the week had become eager to implement MfDR (Managing for Development Results) concepts in their organisation.” The national chapters allow AfCoP peer learners to engage back into their home contexts, with little demands on the AfCoP facilitators.

These are examples of an intentional effort to ensure learning diffusion within and across ‘home’ organisations. In the simplest form it involves a clear strategy to facilitate peer-to-peer connections in the home context, where individuals who have gained from peer interaction are connected to other peers to transfer those gains. This is an essential characteristic of any learning organisation (where individuals are constantly encouraged to learn and connections between individuals are facilitated to allow for peer-learning opportunities).

A useful example of an approach to allow the potential of new learning to be tested in practice is the rapid results initiative. The essential idea would be that, with new insights and access to just-in-time suggestions and guidance from the peer community, the peer learner would seek to create a replicable pilot change project. Rather than arguing for change that might emerge over the longer term if new approaches are adopted now, the rapid results approach challenges the reformer to devise small changes in each step of the results chain which, together, would lead to a small but worthwhile change in the short term (Matta & Ashkenas, 2003).

Developing coalition-building skills

Grindle & Thomas (1991) identifies the conflicts and reactions that are triggered by attempts to change policies and institutions, noting in particular that the higher the public

profile of the reform, the greater the likelihood that questions of political survival will drive the nature of the resistance to change. This framework has been developed into a useful tool for assessing where the resistance might lie in different types of reforms (Grindle & Thomas, 1991, fig. 8.1). The key insight here is that challenges to implementation do not begin with attempts to implement – they begin in the reform agenda phase when a particular issue is considered for inclusion on the policy agenda. In many cases, the process of developing policy does not begin until policymakers are convinced that the issue is important enough for them to spend time considering it. The process from there can halt at any stage and does not lead in an inevitable linear fashion to implementation.

During all the reform stages, coalition building is a potentially powerful strategy. Coalitions are traditionally thought of as government coalitions, but they can take diverse forms including “‘advocacy’, ‘protest’ and ‘event’ coalitions, in civil or political society, that seek to protest against or campaign for a particular issue or institutional change. Then there are ‘reform’, ‘growth’ or ‘policy’ coalitions, often consisting of formally or informally organised individuals and interests, (both public and private) that seek to direct and push through a strategy for national growth and development, or to effect significant institutional or policy change in key areas of public policy (such as economic liberalisation, social and welfare reform, agricultural modernisation or constitutional or electoral reform).” (Gramont, 2012, p.6)

The research literature has, to date, focused on coalitions which are identifiably political or are pursuing identifiably political objectives (CommGAP, 2008; Gramont, 2012; Leftwich & Wheeler, 2011; Peiffer, 2012). There is little empirical work on coalition building within the bureaucracy (Malinga, 2008). (Christensen, Laegreid, Roness, & Rovik, 2007, ch 2) is one of the few in-depth analyses of strategies which bureaucratic coalitions for public sector reform can develop, noting the significance of identifying common ground, even if that means focusing on means more than ends or narrowing down the sphere of concern to particular agencies or programs in the first instance. However, the lessons set out below translate well into bureaucratic alliance building (Gramont, 2012, p.35)

- Context is king (or queen).

- Goal definition. Clear goal definition is often cited as a key element of an effective coalition. Some coalitions... did not start out with a particular issue, but they did have a clear purpose and worked towards defining their agendas.
- Coalition size. A coalition should be as small as possible to achieve its ends. Coalition size may not be constant; sometimes a coalition can expand or contract over time.
- Role of coalition members. Leaders are important, but are not the only relevant actors. Coalitions also need change champions, connectors, enablers, gatekeepers, and others beyond the coalitions.
- Choice of issue. Some coalitions begin around a specific issue and recruit members, while other times a group comes together first and then picks which issue it wants to focus on. The right strategy depends on context, but it can be dangerous to pick an issue before determining whether there is a natural coalition to support it. Coalitions are likely to be stronger if the issue emerges internally rather than being imposed from outside, one participant noted. At the same time, member commitment to the issue may be more important than ownership over its conception.
- Types of issues. Non-threatening ('non-toxic') issues can help coalitions gain traction. Focusing on small changes can lead to broader outcomes. It is good to work on issues that resonate with excluded members of society.
- Framing. Coalitions can adopt various strategies to pitch their issue to the world, from subtle to very public. It is important that the choice of approach is strategic and adapted to local circumstances.
- Management and rules of the game. Coalitions need to balance planning and adaptability, as well as develop mechanisms to ensure commitment of members and deal with distrust. Formal rules are not always necessary but members should agree on the (if necessary informal) rules of the game, particularly around funding and resources.
- Impact. Social change and organisational strengthening are dual and sometimes competing goals of coalitions. Coalitions should be action-oriented and if possible work on multiple levels.

- Short-term and long term results and benefits. While coalitions may be started to achieve a particular policy or institutional change, the experience for the participants or organisations of working in that way can produce other important benefits in the longer term, whether the coalition is successful in achieving its goals or not. For example, in currently limited or authoritarian political contexts, the experience of coalition work can prepare such groups to play an active part in an emerging pluralistic democracy, as and when political space opens up.
- Sustainability. Coalitions do not need to be permanent and in many cases should not be. Coalition members retain their own identities and have right of entry and exit. Sustainability can happen if the coalition feels it has accomplished its goals and dissolves, if the idea takes on a life of its own, or if the issue is redefined. At the same time, if the coalition has long-term goals then sustainability requires continued access to funds.

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